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The author puts forth an analytical framework called party-state realism for 
understanding how policy makers in the People’s Republic of China approach foreign policy. 
It has four defining characteristics.  In order of importance, they are: putting the interests of 
the Communist Party at the core of China’s national interest calculation; and on this basis 
adopting an instrumentalist approach; adopting a party-centric nationalism; and adhering to a 
neoclassical realist assessment of the country’s place in the international system and its 
relative material power in advancing national interest. In this conception, the putting of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s interest at the core of national interest is a constant, not a 
variable, factor. This does not mean the changing international context and relative national 




With China emerging as the only other potential superpower and its leader Xi Jinping 
articulating an ambition for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to take centre stage in 
global affairs, it is useful to have an analytical framework that sets out the drivers of Chinese 
foreign policy.2  Notwithstanding Xi’s rhetoric that China should take centre stage in world 
affairs and the fact that Chinese power has been on an uninterrupted upward trajectory for 
over two decades, it remains reluctant, in comparison to other permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council, to take on leadership roles in global affairs where Chinese 
interests are not immediately at stake.  Its unusual approach poses a challenge to mainstream 
international relations theories.  While neoclassical realism seems to apply to how the 
Chinese approach many foreign policy issues, it falls short as changing relative national 
power and state to state relations are not the primary driver of Chinese foreign policy.  
Although Alastair Iain Johnston concludes that China is a status quo rather than a revisionist 
power, such a distinction is ultimately moot.3 In reality, Beijing takes ‘an à la carte approach 
to the existing system, supporting those international institutions that serve its interests (…), 
turning others (…) to its own purposes, and weakening or subverting those (…) that might 
otherwise pose a challenge to its legitimacy.’4 A recognition of the limitations of mainstream 
international relations theories as applied to China has led to attempts to find alternative 
explanations to explain China’s approach to the rest of the world.  Quansheng Zhao opted for 
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2 Xi’s speech at 19th Congress of Chinese Communist Party, 18 Oct. 2017, 
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3 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, International Security, 27:4 (2003) pp.5-56. 




the micro-macro linkage concept that addresses the interactions between international 
constraints and domestic determinants at the macro level as well as the approach of decision 
makers at the micro level.5  Conceived two decades ago his analysis was based on experience 
in the transition from the Mao Zedong to the Deng Xiaoping era.  China under Xi has 
changed considerably since then.  Feiling Wang puts forth an interpretation that perceptively 
identifies three key drivers for Chinese foreign policy, namely ‘the CPC’s political 
preservation, China’s economic prosperity and more Chinese power and prestige’.6  But he 
does not explain how they relate to the wider literature on international relations.  More 
recently, June Teufel Dreyer has looked astutely at an indigenous concept, the tianxia (all 
under heaven) trope.7  While the worldview of China’s leaders definitely reveals significant 
elements of the tianxia trope, the PRC’s foreign policy is driven by forces more powerful 
than its Sinocentric worldview. 
 
A striking reality that distinguishes China’s approach to foreign policy from that of 
most great powers is the centrality of domestic politics.8 Contrary to the pattern in most great 
powers or the thrust of main international relations theories, which focus on foreign policy 
considerations, relative capabilities and state to state interaction, consistently the most basic 
driver of the PRC foreign policy is domestic. The international relations theories that fit this 
reality best are Innenpolitik theories though on their own they are also insufficient to explain 
Chinese foreign policy as a whole. In general terms Innenpolitik theories ‘argue that internal 
factors such as political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, or 
socioeconomic structure determine how countries behave toward the world beyond their 
borders’.9   
 
In the case of the PRC its approach is determined first and foremost by its political 
system.  A focus on the system rather than ideology is important as Communism as the state 
ideology has essentially been put aside in the post-Mao era, particularly after the Tiananmen 
Massacre (1989) and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. As this author has 
explained elsewhere the post-Mao system is a ‘consultative Leninist’ one, which means the 
‘Communist Party is obsessively focused on staying in power, for which maintaining stability 
in the country and pre-emptively eliminating threats to its political supremacy are deemed 
essential’.10 This is such an overriding consideration for policy makers in China that it 
applies as much to foreign policy as it does to domestic policies.  As Xi told Chinese 
diplomats, they must ‘uphold the authority of the CPC Central Committee as the overarching 
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principle and strengthen the centralized, unified leadership of the Party on external work’.11 
This is the point of departure for but not the sum total of Chinese foreign policy making. 
 
Being the core of the ‘consultative Leninist’ system the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) is much more than the governing party or the party in power. It in effect claims and 
takes ownership of the country or the state and it asserts a monopoly in national narrative 
including how national interest is defined.  The system in place is a Leninist party-state as the 
Party exercises a monopoly of the state and military power to an extent unimaginable in 
democracies or most authoritarian states. Based on this reality this paper puts forth a new 
analytical framework called party-state realism for understanding how PRC policy makers 
approach foreign policy in the post-Mao era.  (This analytical framework should also be 
applicable to other Leninist party-states after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union.) In this conception, the putting of the CPC’s interest at the core of 
national interest is a constant, not a variable, factor that underpins Beijing’s foreign policy 
making. This does not mean the changing international context is irrelevant, just that it takes 
secondary importance. 
 
This approach implies that national interest calculation as applied by Chinese policy 
makers may or may not match a non-partisan evaluation of what would be in China’s national 
interest.  Official Chinese foreign policy does not acknowledge that its starting point is the 
interest of the Party.  Instead, it presents foreign policy in terms of promoting Chinese 
national interest.  In the Xi era, this is posed as a revival of the greatness of China 
encapsulated in ‘the China Dream’.12 To understand Beijing’s actual foreign policy one 
should not start with (though not ignore) what opportunities are on offer as a result of 
changing relative national power.  Instead, one should start with what the CPC sees as the 
most basic – to protecting and enhancing regime security, which includes maintaining 
stability, upholding national security and sustaining economic growth. Where such an 
assessment is at variance with the articulated foreign policy, it is regime security that 
prevails. 
 
Defining Characteristics  
 
 By adapting consultative Leninism to foreign policy making party-state realism serves 
as an analytical framework for understanding how the Chinese Government in the post-Mao 
era approaches relations with the outside world.  It has four defining characteristics, which 
are, in order of importance: 
• First and foremost, putting the interests in particular the survival of the Communist 
Party at the core of China’s national interest calculation; and on this basis  
• Adopting an instrumentalist approach to international organizations, cooperation, law 
and norm as well as economic ties;  
• Adopting a party-centric nationalism that instils in its citizens a belief that the 
restoration of China’s greatness and its rightful place in the world can only be 
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achieved under the leadership of the Party;13 and finally, taking into account these 
three factors, 
• Adhering to a neoclassical realist assessment of the country’s place in the 
international system and its relative material power in advancing national interest. 
 
Party-first national interest 
 
Even though Xi Jinping is not attempting a Maoist restoration,14 he acts as if he were 
the true heir to the PRC’s founding leader, Mao Zedong, as he seeks to reclaim China’s place 
as the most magnificent great power in the world. In the language of the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century it means transforming China into a superpower.  This is to be 
achieved by pursuing the China Dream of national rejuvenation, which is to be secured by 
adhering closely to the leadership of the CPC.15 While Xi has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s 
policy of ‘hiding capabilities and bidding for time’, he has merely done what is inherent in 
Deng’s approach, which is for China to assert itself when it is ready.  This quest is also 
complementary to the Party’s assertion of core national interests, which came into usage in 
the mid-1990s and gained general currency in the 2000s.16 It is reinforced by Xi’s instruction 
to Chinese diplomats that ‘they are first and foremost “party cadres”.’17 
 
China’s core interests are summed up most succinctly by Dai Binguo in 2009 when he 
was the State Councilor superintending foreign policy. He defined them as ‘foremost, 
preserving China’s basic state system and state security; after this, national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; and in third place, sustain stable development of the economy and society 
(第一是维护基本制度和国家安全，其次是国家主权和领土完整，第三是经济社会的持
续稳定发展).18 Dai’s formulation sets the tone and has been adhered to by other Chinese 
officials and scholars. Indeed, this was reaffirmed by Yang Jiechi who performs a similar role 
under Xi. Yang said that as Xi Jinping instructed, ‘upholding the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics is the most basic task in foreign 
policy’.19  Even though Dai was clear in the order of importance, Michael Swaine argues that 
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consultative Leninism. Tsang, ‘Consultative Leninism’, p.866. 
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necessary in order to lead China to achieve its ‘revolutionary goal’ as defined by the supreme leader.  
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19杨洁篪 ‘在习近平总书记外交思想指引下不断开创对外工作新局面 (Continuously breaking new 




in light of the relative frequency in how all three components were mentioned by Chinese 
officials and media, it was the second component that was most important.20  
 
Swaine’s relegation of the protection of the party-state to a lower priority reflects a 
misunderstanding of the original Chinese text, particularly the term guojia anquan (国家安
全) and the explicit ordering of the priorities – Swaine mistook them for numbered bullet 
points. This has resulted in a misreading of the Party’s intent and Dai’s words which, as the 
rest of this section shows, reflect the reality of Chinese foreign policy.  In common with 
many international relations scholars, Swaine translated guojia anquan into ‘national 
security’, a term with clear meaning in the English language that chimes with international 
relations literature.  The correct translation should have been ‘state security’, implying 
regime security. If Dai or the Party had intended guojia anquan to mean ‘national security’, 
he would have put it with the number two component where it would have fitted in well.  
Indeed, state or regime security reinforces the first and foremost component, which is about 
protecting the party-state, essential for the physical security of the leaders and potentially 
their families.21 This is the starting point for the Chinese Government view of its core 
interests. It is about domestic politics which is not contested by external players, and thus 
does not require regular reiteration by Chinese leaders and officials.  In contrast, national 
security issues like the sovereignty of Taiwan (and other disputed territories) are highly 
contested internationally, which accounts for the frequency for Chinese officials to refer to 
them.  Swaine’s focus on the frequency and intensity that Taiwan and territorial integrity 
issues are mentioned thus misses the point.  With this key concept of guojia anquan 
mistranslated, Swaine looked pass Dai’s statement which put the first component down as the 
foremost core interest.  Being misunderstood by Swaine does not change the reality of 
China’s definition of core interests, which remains that articulated by Dai – the most basic 
component is regime security. National security, focusing on the upholding of China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, comes second.  Sustaining economic and social stability 
and growth ranks third. This applies all through the post-Mao era, and remains the case under 
Xi.   
 
Making this distinction enables us to make sense of the PRC’s policy towards the 
Korean Peninsula, particularly as the North Korean regime under Kim Jong-en created a 
nuclear and missile crisis despite China’s declared policy of no nuclear weapons or war on 
the peninsula.22  In addition, Xi Jinping publicly affirmed at the 19th Party Congress (October 
2017) that he would like China to take centre stage in global affairs. Putting them together it 
is reasonable to extrapolate that it is in China’s national interest to find a way to ease tension 
on the Korean Peninsula and pre-empt escalation into military hostilities.  Admittedly, China 
may not be able to resolve this long-standing thorny issue. But it will earn a place in the 
centre stage of world affairs if it proactively takes a leadership role in finding a constructive 
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translation. 
20 Swaine, ‘China’s Assertive Behavior’, p.5.  
21 The physical security of top leaders has become an acute issue under Xi who ended the immunity 
of retired Politburo Standing Committee members against all charges when he violated the post-
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way forward.  Instead, Beijing chose passive cooperation with United Nations sanctions and, 
above all, an insistence that the world, in particular the United States of America (USA), 
should not see China as the key to a solution on the Korean Peninsula, at least until China 
appeared to be completely side-lined when South Korean President Moon Jae-in secured a 
breakthrough with the winter Olympics diplomacy of early 2018.23 It is noteworthy that 
China played no active part in bringing this about though its tightening of sanction in 2017 
undoubtedly forced Kim’s hand. The success of Moon in breaking the ice suggests that there 
was scope for China to have taken more of a leadership role to get the North Koreans and the 
Americans to talk. Likewise, there is no evidence that Beijing took any initiative to set up the 
2018 Singapore summit between Trump and Kim, in contrast to supporting Kim in preparing 
for the summit once it had been scheduled. 
 
Why did Beijing choose to avoid taking on a proactive leadership role over Korea, 
when the changing state to state relations and the relative strength of China’s position on the 
peninsula made it the best placed great power to do so while the Trump Administration’s 
belligerency caused widespread international concern in 2017? This becomes understandable 
if the party-state realist framework is applied.   
 
In this framework the first and foremost priority for Beijing is not taking centre-stage 
in global affairs, an articulated goal but not an essential requirement.  However the Chinese 
Government may spin it, resolving the Korean crisis will be seen domestically as working 
with the Trump Administration, which threatened ‘fire and fury’ against the Kim regime, a 
‘fraternal’ Leninist state whose survival depended on Chinese support.  If the Party should 
appear domestically as weak vis-à-vis the Trump Administration in undercutting the Kim 
regime, Xi risks being seen as wobbling over his commitment to do whatever it takes to nib 
in the bud any challenge to the supremacy of the Party within China.  The latter was amongst 
his first major statements of intent after becoming leader in 2012. In his visit to Guangdong 
late that year he stressed that under his leadership the Party would not made the mistake of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which no one was ‘man enough’ to stand up 
against the betrayal of Mikhail Gorbachev in presiding over the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.24 Since then Xi has consistently reaffirmed a commitment to pre-empt anyone from 
doubting his determination to sustain the consultative Leninist system. 
 
Indeed, if the PRC acts solely on neoclassical realism it will have taken on a 
leadership role to try to resolve the Korean crisis.  To China as a nation there are no 
compelling reasons why it must sustain the Kim regime, since it has largely ignored China’s 
concerns as it pursues its own nuclear ambition. Indeed, the Kim regime has not been a better 
neighbor to China than South Korea, emphatically since 2011 and arguably for a good deal 
longer, notwithstanding the existence of a mutual defense treaty between China and North 
Korea.  Given the great disparity in power even in a hypothetical scenario of North Korea 
being taken over by South Korea, Beijing can expect its uncooperative, unreliable and 
troublesome neighbor to be replaced by a united Korea governed from Seoul, which has been 
very friendly to China.  A newly united Korea preoccupied with integrating the north cannot 
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afford to take on China and can be expected to continue a friendly and cooperative policy 
towards China.  If China had taken a leadership role to bring about such an eventuality it 
would be in a good position to enhance its interests. 
 
Alleged concern that China as a nation may have over an implosion of North Korea – 
a massive refugee influx and the loss of a buffer state – are grossly exaggerated. The harsh 
terrain in the China-North Korea borders, the relatively small population on the Korean side 
of the border region, the Yalu River guarded by the Korean People’s Army and the People’s 
Liberation Army on both shores, as well as the prospect of being treated as second class 
citizens in a much wealthier and human rights respecting united Korea against being at best 
tolerated as troublemaking refugees in Leninist China should make the risk of a large refugee 
influx low.  This is not to say some Chinese leaders do not want to preempt even a small 
influx of Korean refugees to an economically degenerating region with a significant Korean 
minority population, which may pose an unwanted challenge to the Party in the Northeast. 
Given that the government of a united Korea will inherit the nuclear arsenal of the North 
while the United States Government will work to remove it from the Peninsula, tension 
between them will heighten.  Furthermore, the USA will have lost the raison d'etre for 
stationing troops in South Korea. The risk that the new Korean government will allow the 
USA build new bases in the North while existing ones are underutilized is therefore 
negligible.25 China’s national interest, in contrast to that of the Communist Party, does not 
require China to sustain the Kim regime, though both would prefer stability on the peninsula 
and the elimination of the risk of any accident involving nuclear devices.26  
 
Can Beijing be reticent because its scope to influence North Korea has been 
significantly reduced since Kim Jong-en came to power in 2011 and purged all Beijing-
friendly senior figures from his regime?  While this is undoubtedly regrettable to Beijing, it 
does not change the reality that China still ‘provides North Korea with most of its food and 
energy supplies and accounts for more than 90 percent of North Korea’s total trade 
volume.’27 This economic leverage is admittedly insufficient to make Kim give up his 
nuclear program but China does not need to resolve the nuclear crisis to secure a place in 
center-stage of global affairs. By taking the lead to do so and using its economic 
leverage will have gone a very long way to achieve this. After all, China gained 
enormous kudos in the recent past by merely hosting the non-conclusive six-party talks. 
There is much that Beijing can gain in its standing in the world by taking a constructive 
leadership role in seeking a solution.  This is an option dismissed because ultimately the 
                                                 
25 The USA has 15 bases in South Korea, of which two are operated by the Air Force and one by the 
Navy. Of the two Air Force bases, only Osan is home to a combat air wing.  With the Kunshan base 
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Korea’, 12 June 2018, Reuters, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-northkorea-usa-military/trump-
surprises-with-pledge-to-end-military-exercises-in-south-korea-idUKKBN1J816N (accessed, 15 June 
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26 Ironically, the risk of an accident involving a nuclear device on the Peninsular is more likely to be 
reduced with a united Korean with no nuclear weapons than a North Korea armed with nuclear 
weapons. 
27 Eleanor Albert, ‘The China-North Korea Relationship’, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-




Chinese leadership is, for regime security reasons, unwilling to show a lack of 
determination to sustain its vexatious Leninist ‘little brother’. 
 
China’s approach towards the Korean peninsula is not an aberration. The same basic 
consideration determines how its government tackles foreign policy generally. Xi might have 
spoken as if China were ready to take a leadership role in economic globalization at Davos 
(2017) when the Trump Administration advocated ‘America first’.28  But his government did 
not really follow up on such a grandiose gesture.  The Chinese Government talks about 
global common good but acts on Party interests.  This attitude is also reflected powerfully in 
China’s support for authoritarian regimes globally.   
 
There is no reason to believe that supporting any type of political system, be it 
democratic or authoritarian is inherently in the national interest of China, in contrast to that of 
the Party.  The experience of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China show that Chinese 
people can flourish in a democracy, a hybrid system or a Leninist party-state. The PRC also 
maintains good and mutually beneficial relations with countries across regime types.  The 
better relationship Beijing has with Seoul than with Pyongyang underlines the irrelevance of 
regime type. Likewise, authoritarian Vietnam does not maintain friendlier relations with the 
PRC than democratic Indonesia within Southeast Asia. 
 
But Chinese foreign policy is geared to support authoritarian states, even though it is 
not official Chinese policy to export the consultative Leninist model.29 The official position, 
in the language of Xinhua, is that ‘the CPC is willing to share its vision, path and 
experience’.30 Technically, the policy is not to proactively export the Chinese political 
system but to assist any government which seeks to learn from its authoritarian development 
model. Beijing also seeks to ensure its approach to governance in the Internet and other areas 
prevails globally.  But the crux of the matter is to stem the tide of change unleashed by the 
advent of color revolutions at the end of the Cold War. Supporting authoritarian states makes 
the CPC less vulnerable to any Western ‘conspiracy’ inherent in the idea of a ‘peaceful 
evolution’.31  
 
In an important sense this Chinese approach both contrasts against and parallels the 
American commitment to aid democracy abroad. Successive US administrations since 
President Woodrow Wilson have steadily incorporated this principle into the body politics of 
US foreign policy – at least until Donald Trump became President.32 Wilson started the 
                                                 
28 CGTN, ‘Full Text of Xi Jinping keynote at the World Economic Forum’ 17 Jan. 2017, 
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(accessed, 20 Aug 2018). 
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process to ‘make the world safe for democracy’, a sentiment shared by most Americans.  It is 
true that some national leaders in other political systems, for example Nicholas Maduro of 
Venezuela, prioritizes personal interest above wider national interest.  Arguably even Trump 
does it in the USA, a long-established democracy.  But an individual leader pursuing personal 
interest above national ones is not the same as a political system invariably putting sustaining 
the Party’s monopoly of power above the state and national interest. In China its leader 
systematically acts on the Party’s behalf to make the world safe for authoritarian states.  By 
issuing Document 9 of 2013, Xi has made it clear the Party must resolutely oppose and 
eliminate any effort to promote ‘western’ concepts like constitutional democracy or universal 
values.33  With sustaining the Party’s rule being the starting point of China’s national interest, 
the PRC consistently supports authoritarian states to survive, develop and flourish – as an 
antidote to post-Cold War color revolutions in recent decades.  
 
Instrumentalist in cooperation or confrontation 
 
 The Chinese Government regularly underlines the importance of basic principles, 
such as non-interventionism, projecting an image that it is a principled actor in international 
affairs. Its proclivity to take a moralistic stance reflects the domestic political reality that as a 
party-state it enjoys a monopoly of ‘the truth’ and narrative at home and its policies are 
always right. But, in reality, it engages with the rest of the world on calculation of interests.  
Indeed, pragmatism inherent in neoclassical realism modified by party-first national interests 
means that the Chinese Government’s basic approach to cooperation or confrontation is 
instrumentalist, which is in general terms the second most important defining feature of 
party-state realism.   
 
 This is reflected most clearly in how Beijing views and deals with the international 
order centered on the United Nations and its ancillary institutions.  International 
organizations or institutions are valued or dismissed depending on how useful they are to 
Beijing but Chinese rhetoric always presents its approach as based on high-sounding 
principles. In reality where the international order does not work to the interest of the party-
state, the Chinese Government dismisses it or seeks to change it but where it does, it upholds 
the order.  This instrumentalist approach renders efforts to categorize China a status quo or 
revisionist power moot.  
 
Before the PRC was widely embraced as a near superpower and was able to assert 
itself strongly, it was highly defensive about the international human rights regime in light of 
domestic abuse of rights.  It largely dismisses this regime as part of the post-war US-centric 
world order that allowed the West to intervene into the domestic affairs of poorer countries. 
As it does so it deliberately ignores the history that China actually played a key role in 
creating this regime.  Chinese diplomat P.C. Chang (Zhang Pengchun) served as one of the 
first vice-chairmen of the Commission on Human Rights and was ‘one of the most active and 
influential participants in the writing of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’(UDHR).34 Indeed, Chang made his ‘most important contribution’ in his ‘strong 
commitment to the universality of the UDHR’.35  
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When the UN regime on human rights was to be revamped in the 2000s Beijing saw a 
threat and an opportunity. It neutralized the threat by seizing the opportunity. It ‘engaged 
heavily in the institution-building negotiations’ and secured a seat at the new Human Rights 
Council to limit criticism against it.36 A decade since the Council was established and as 
China takes a more assertive approach under Xi, it strives to make the Council align closer to 
its interests. It seeks ‘to block or weaken UN resolutions on civil society, human rights 
defenders and peaceful protests’ as well as pushing back against efforts to strengthen some of 
the mechanisms for country-specific rights advancement.37 Consequently, the Human Rights 
Council is no longer a regular thorn on China’s side even though the detention of about one 
in ten of the entire Uyghur population in camps (officially called ‘vocational training 
centers’)  in Xinjiang means the abuse of rights in China has reached a level unprecedented 
since the Beijing Massacre of 1989.38 The same international institution to which Beijing 
took exception when it put pressure on human rights in China has now been neutralized.39 
Indeed, Beijing’s instrumentalist approach has transformed this important UN agency from 
being a ‘hostile’ organization into a ‘friendly’ one. 
 
At the core of the UN itself, China enjoys its status as a permanent member of the 
Security Council, which carries the obligation to share the ‘responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security’, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter.40 Unlike 
the USA, Britain or France, which regularly take on a lead role on difficult peace and security 
issues China prefers to stay in the backseat.41 China also conducts itself differently from 
Russia as it, on balance, does ‘not opt for obstructive behavior in the S[ecurity] C[ouncil]’ 
either.42 It is important not to confuse supporting peace-keeping with taking a leadership role 
in maintaining international peace and security.   
 
In peace keeping operations China provides more troops than any other permanent 
member of the Security Council. But then ‘developing states … typically compose the top ten 
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troop contributors.’43  Indeed, UN peace-keeping operations historically did not usually 
involve troops from the permanent members of the Security Council in order to avoid them 
dominating such operations. What is noteworthy about the Chinese approach to peace-
keeping is how pragmatic it has been in reversing its previous refusal to support it.  As it 
seeks to project a new identity of being ‘simultaneously a great power and a Global South 
member’ it proactively provides funding and troops to support peace-keeping operations.44   
 
China remains reticent in taking a leadership role on international peace and security 
generally, and even in its neighborhood.  As explained, it has consistently refused to play a 
more proactive part than hosting the six-party talks (2003-8) over the Korean Peninsula, a 
significant but essentially passive role.   
 
As a permanent Security Council member China is keener to keep the existing 
membership and structure unchanged even though it officially supports ‘increasing the 
representation of developing countries’ to counter the West’s disproportionate dominance.45  
China advocates keeping the Security Council unchanged in order to ensure that Japan cannot 
gain a permanent seat.46 It upholds the existing international system as it ‘basically serves the 




A ‘consultative Leninist’ system requires a party-directed belief system to give it 
ideological cohesion in order to operate effectively.  When Communism ceased to function as 
the state ideology after the Beijing Massacre of 1989, the Party adopted nationalism to fill the 
void, even though it continued to espouse Communism as the official ideology.  Strictly 
speaking nationalism is not a proper ideology like Communism. It was chosen because it was 
‘the most reliable claim to the Chinese people’s loyalty and the only important value shared 
by the regime and its critics.’48  It enabled the Party ‘to position themselves as the defenders 
of China’s national pride’ and unity.49 In this sense it gives an ideological cohesion to the 
party-state. Since then the party-state has effectively instilled in PRC citizens the ‘my country 
right or wrong’ brand of nationalism. But this also imposes a requirement that any Chinese 
foreign policy must pass a patriotic test, which generally entails the government not 
appearing weak under pressure vis-à-vis its international interlocutors.  This is the third 
defining feature of party-state realism. 
 
As Xi makes ‘the China Dream’ a center piece of Chinese nationalism it takes on an 
increasingly assertive tone. It is now about ‘making China great again’. This passed a 
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significant landmark in the 19th Party Congress (October 2017) when Xi put an end to 
internal debates on whether China’s moment had come. He ended the Dengist strategy of 
‘hiding capabilities and bidding for one’s time’ and proclaimed a new era in which China 
expects to take center stage in global affairs.50  Xi has increased the relative weight of 
nationalism as a defining feature of party-state realism and transformed it into the second 
most important factor.51  
 
At the 19th Congress, Xi also reaffirmed: ‘As history has shown and will continue to 
bear witness to, without the leadership of the Communist Party of China, national 
rejuvenation would be just wishful thinking.’52 Under Xi’s stewardship, Chinese nationalism 
is undergoing a further modification – my country right or wrong now implies my party right 
or wrong, even my leader right or wrong.  Criticizing the Communist Party or Xi’s leadership 
is now deemed unpatriotic if articulated by a Chinese and considered unfriendly if made by a 
foreigner or foreign government.53 This imposes an element of ideological rigidity and thus 
reduces Chinese foreign policy’s scope to take full advantage of the constantly changing 
international scene.   
 
The implication of this new approach is that cold instrumentalism is increasingly 
required to make way for the more emotional urge to insist on China and its leadership being 
duly respected. To be sure, this process started even before Xi became leader. Towards the 
end of Hu Jintao’s tenure, after the West’s post-Cold War triumphalism was revealed as 
hubris when the global financial crisis hit, Hu’s hallmark instrumentalist policy of stressing 
China’s rise would be peaceful had begun to be eroded.  When Hilary Clinton challenged 
China’s salami approach to claim the South China Sea as its newest core interest in 2010 
(about which more later), Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi pushed back. As Yang 
accused the USA of plotting against China he also threatened Singapore. He said ‘China is a 
big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact’, reportedly ‘staring 
directly at Singapore's foreign minister’ as he did so.54 This was unnecessary, 
counterproductive and not in accord with the instrumentalist approach. It is noteworthy that 
there is no evidence that Yang did so under Hu’s order. 
 
This drift towards emotion driven assertiveness became mainstream after Xi took over 
from Hu. Yang’s successor as Foreign Minister Wang Yi surpassed Yang by publicly 
lambasting a Canadian journalist during an official visit to Ottawa in 2016. When the 
Canadian reporter questioned him about China’s human rights record, Wang retorted: ‘This is 
totally unacceptable. Have you ever been to China? Please do not ask questions in such an 
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irresponsible manner.’55 Likewise, when Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull 
articulated concern over foreign powers ‘making unprecedented and increasingly 
sophisticated attempts to influence the political process’ in Australia in late 2017 the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesman countered in public: ‘We are astounded by the relevant remarks 
of the Australian leader. Such remarks simply cater to the irresponsible reports by some 
Australian media that are without principle and full of bias against China.’56 Neither the 
Canadian reporter nor the Australian Prime Minister was hostile to China though they 
questioned the record of the Communist Party in human rights or in infiltrating Australian 
society and politics. While they reflected discomfort, it was the forceful Chinese responses 
that caused real concern.  
 
This assertiveness driven by party-centric nationalism further undermines a specific 
objective of Chinese foreign policy – the cultivation of soft power.  Indeed, what the Chinese 
Government has in reality managed to project, more intensely under Xi than previously, is 
not soft power but what Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig have described as ‘sharp 
power’.  Sharp ‘in the sense that they pierce, penetrate, or perforate the political and 
information environments in the targeted countries’, which seek ‘to manipulate their target 
audiences by distorting the information that reaches them’.57 Unlike Russia, which has little 
choice but to resort to sharp power to make itself relevant globally, China’s stunning 
achievements in the last decade have given it scope for real soft power. As symbols of 
capitalism like the Lehman Brothers collapsed and Western democracies careened into crisis 
China’s ‘consultative Leninist’ model looked impressive as it emerged from the global 
financial crisis. In the Xi era, China is home to world class companies like Alibaba and 
Tencent and a leader in cutting edge technologies such as artificial intelligence.  It now has 
tremendous scope to generate international admiration without resorting to sharp power. 
However, party-centric nationalism directs the Xi Administration to project ‘soft power’ 
through Confucius Institutes and the Belt and Road Initiative and, in so doing, confuses sharp 
power with soft power.58  
 
Neoclassical realism at work 
  
 With the Party’s interest as the starting point of national interest, neo-classical realism 
provides a useful guide for understanding China’s foreign policy calculation. For this to work 
well one also needs to factor in the instrumentalist ‘magic weapon’ of the United Front and 
party-centric nationalism.  
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The United Front concept was originally introduced by Vladimir Lenin but Mao 
modified it to make it much more potent. As the CPC still has a United Front Department, it 
is easy to assume that the United Front is about the work of this shadowy unit, of which the 
overwhelming majority of its 12 sub-departments are domestically focused. To do so will 
miss another, more important, side to the United Front.  Mao would not have described it as 
one of the three ‘magic weapons’ if he did not think this was highly effective.59  The United 
Front needs to be understood as a methodology which the Party uses to guide foreign policy 
as it does domestic struggles.   
 
The United Front is about ensuring the CPC will come out on top in any contest.  Its 
starting point is to distinguish enemies from friends and treat them in ways to cripple enemies 
step by step.60  ‘In the simplest terms, the United Front requires the Party to identify a 
principal enemy, its supporters, and the intermediate zone full of “wavering elements” that 
can be won over by either the Party or its principal enemy.’61  The Party is required to 
exercise strong discipline to focus its attack on the principal enemy and win over, or at least 
neutralize, as many as possible in the intermediate zone. The Party has no illusion that 
alliances thus forged would be temporary. They are meant to isolate and thus weaken the 
principal enemy.  Once the principal enemy has been destroyed, the Party elevates one from 
among the secondary enemies in the intermediate zone to new principal enemy status. It now 
becomes the focus of attack until it too is defeated. The Party is supposed to repeat the 
process until no enemy is left and those in the intermediate zone are all converted to 
‘friends’.62 
 
By harnessing this to foreign policy the Chinese Government takes a hardnosed 
approach to assess relative strength between itself and its interlocutors, on the basis of 
‘comprehensive national strength’ as well as the relative capacity to make the international 
environment conducive to its interests.63  As Anne-Marie Brady rightly observes, the Party 
takes to heart Lord Palmerston’s famous adage – ‘there are no permanent friends, only 
permanent interests.’64  Embedding the United Front approach ‘requires Chinese foreign 
policy makers to stay focused on one primary enemy at any one time.’65 As they do so they 
calculate relative strength as well as costs and benefits ruthlessly but this does not imply they 
always understand the others or the context astutely or maintain the discipline required to 
secure the desired results. Indeed, party-centric nationalism and/or over-confidence based on 
nouveau rich hubris can distort or weaken adherence to the United Front methodology.   
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This approach is exemplified in how China handles the maritime disputes in South 
China Sea. While its government laid claim based on a map drawn up by its predecessor 
government dating back to 1947, it issued ‘no legal document … which formally recognizes 
the legal status of the nine-dashed line’ map.66 As China’s standing in East Asia and its 
‘comprehensive national strength’ reached a new height in 2010, the Chinese authorities 
allowed or encouraged retired senior officers and affiliates to its national defense educational 
establishment to put forth the idea that South China Sea and the reefs and rocks China claims 
should be treated as a kind of proto core interest.67  If such statements went unchallenged the 
Chinese would be able to generate incrementally a ‘conventional wisdom’ that South China 
Sea should be deemed their core national interest.  According to Hilary Clinton Chinese State 
Councilor Dai Bingguo mentioned (presumably in private as no public statement can be 
found) South China Sea as a core interest at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
in May 2010 about which she contested.68 Clinton’s account has been questioned by Michael 
Swaine who concludes that ‘Beijing has not unambiguously identified the South China Sea 
issue as one of its core interests’ and if Clinton’s recollection was correct, it ‘was done in a 
decidedly unofficial manner’.69  Swaine’s latter assessment is likely to be on the mark.  Up to 
the end of Hu Jintao’s term of office (2012) Beijing had been very careful in not allowing any 
senior official or active service senior officer articulate such a claim formally or publicly, 
which would have put South China Sea on par with Taiwan or Tibet.70   
 
A major development did take place in the summer of 2010, when Clinton, as 
American Secretary of State, for the first time publicly challenged the salami-slicing 
approach of the PRC in seeking to change international perception of South China Sea. 
International recognition that Beijing would use force to defend its core interest gives 
significance to such Chinese efforts.  Clinton put Beijing on the spot by declaring at the July 
ASEAN Regional Forum meeting that ‘The United States has a national interest in freedom 
of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in 
the South China Sea’.71 The Chinese Government pulled back and the demi-official assertion 
of the South China Sea as proto core interest ceased. When Premier Wen Jiabao next 
reiterated China’s commitment to defend its core interests in a speech to the United Nations 
the following month, it was conspicuous by its absence.72   
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But Beijing did not give up.  It changed tack. After Xi became leader China built 
artificial islands out of reefs and rocks in the Spratly group and put military installations on 
them notwithstanding Xi’s public pledge not to militarize them.73  Creating new realities on 
the ground that cannot be reversed without the use of force has replaced the previous 
approach of getting de facto acknowledgement of China’s claim. A realistic calculation was 
made that no Southeast Asian disputant has the capacity and the USA cannot find a legitimate 
basis and secure international support to reverse its island building.  
 
By embedding the United Front concept, the Chinese approach to foreign policy is 
governed by a careful calculation of both ‘comprehensive national strength’ and its ability to 
win friends and isolate its principal enemy at any one time.  This is essentially a realist 
conception as China seeks to maximize its advantage and push its interests as far as it can go, 
but it retreats tactically when it meets resistance backed by forces more powerful than what it 
can muster.  But this can be and has under Xi increasingly been distorted where party-centric 




 The defining features of party-state realism consist of two types.  The first and 
foremost feature, systematically putting the Party first, is a constant factor which is the 
starting point for Chinese foreign policy making.  The ‘consultative Leninist’ system in place 
is based on the collective leadership at the top but it is a system that can accommodate the 
rise of a strongman. Since the 19th Party Congress (2017) collective leadership has in effect 
been replaced by leadership of the core leader, Xi.  In such a context, ‘Party first’ sometimes 
means ‘core leader first’, and party directives on foreign policy, as with all policies, now 
need to dovetail ‘Xi Jinping Thought for socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era’. 
But the basic political system has not changed, and notwithstanding the concentration of 
power in Xi’s hands China remains a party-state.  What distinguishes China’s approach is 
that this is driven by the political system and not the personal whims of its leader who 
occasionally puts personal interest ahead of national interest, which can happen in any 
political system.  The party-state realism framework applies whether the Party is dominated 
by a core leader or a collective leadership. What remains essential to understanding Chinese 
foreign policy is to know what the Party sees as a threat to its monopoly of power in China at 
any one time. 
 
This basic feature determines how Chinese national interests are defined and distorts 
how international relations theories can apply in the case of China. It takes precedent over all 
standard foreign policy considerations of a great power and compels the Chinese government 
not to pursue policies likely to undermine the capacity of the Party to stay in power. In 
practical terms, it leads to a policy to make the world safe for authoritarianism and to reject 
humanitarian interventionism.74 It also injects an element of pragmatism in external 
economic relations since the long-term security of the party-state necessitates the 
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maintenance of a robust economy and steady growth. Should economic pragmatism conflict 
with short-term requirements of the security of the regime, however, it is the latter that 
prevails.  Hence, the signature external policy of Xi, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), will 
remain a flagship policy as long as he stays as core leader, whether it proves to be 
economically beneficial to China or not. The same thinking also restrains China from taking 
full advantage of the US withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Given the size 
of the Chinese economy membership would ensure Chinese domination of TPP, a 
development that could make the BRI appear like a sideshow and thus highly beneficial to 
China.  Likewise, while broadly defined Chinese national interest should need its government 
to seek to defuse the ‘trade war’ with the Trump Administration, this can only happen on the 
proviso that Xi will not appear to bow under American pressure and, above all, that this 
would not require changes that can undermine the consultative Leninist system.  
 
The interplay and relative significance of the second and third defining features – 
instrumentalism and party-centric nationalism – is a dynamic one.  They may not always 
complement each other but they are not inherently mutually exclusive.  Chinese foreign 
policy under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao demonstrated how the two worked complementarily 
under collective leadership.  In this period, internal debates and discussions on policies took 
place on a routine basis, which had the effect of reducing policy swings in favor of one or the 
other.  With the Dengist principle of hiding capabilities and bidding for time prevailing, 
party-centric nationalism merely required foreign policy makers to focus on steering China to 
rise without overtly provoking pushbacks from others.  Before Xi established himself as 
paramount leader and put priority on making China great again, instrumentalism was the 
second defining feature of party-state realism.   
 
By prioritizing the ‘dignity of China’ (and its leader) after Xi’s rise to dominance the 
relative significance of the second and third defining feature by and large changed place.  
Beijing now places greater emphasis on party-centric nationalism than on instrumentalism. 
This should not be seen as a permanent shift, as Xi can reverse them.  Indeed, in many cases, 
the two features still complement each other.  The transformation of the Asian Infrastructure 
and Investment Bank (AIIB) from a ‘China dominated agency’ and ‘a blatant agent of 
Chinese foreign policy’ into a respected international development bank reflects 
instrumentalism at its best – Beijing changed when it realized such changes would enable the 
AIIB to gain wide international support and participation to secure the coveted credibility.75  
Where the ‘dignity of China’ is not at stake instrumentalism remains the second defining 
feature even in the Xi era.  
 
As to the last defining feature, the applicability of neo-classical realism, this works 
once the peculiarity of the other defining features have been taken into account.  It is a 
‘defining’ feature not in the sense that this is new but that this is the international relations 
theory that applies the most.  Starting from the party-first principle neo-classical realism 
explains Chinese foreign policy, though adjustments need to be made to factor in the relative 
importance of instrumentalism and party-centric nationalism at any one time.  When not put 
in a party-centric nationalist straightjacket Chinese foreign policy makers are hardnosed 
realists who mostly seek to maximize the security of the party-state, national security and 
economic advancement of the PRC, and in that order.  
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This concept of party-state realism has been developed on the basis of the realities in 
post-Mao China, but it should not be seen as applicable only to China.  It should also be 
applicable, perhaps with some modifications, to other countries which is a modified Leninist 
party-state.  A notable example is Vietnam.  The variant that should work best for Vietnam is 
likely to be that which prevailed in China before Xi placed party-centric nationalism ahead of 
instrumentalism as the second most important defining feature.  Further research will need to 
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